Responsa for Bava Batra 209:8
ומי סבירא ליה והאמר שמואל בבא באמצע החדש עסקינן אבל בא בתחלת החדש כולו למשכיר בסוף החדש כולו לשוכר
[This, surely, shows that Samuel<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who stated, in the second case, that the buyer acquired possession of every se'ah as it was measured out, on account of the expression, 'each se'ah for a sela', which the seller used after he said, 'I sell you a kor for thirty'. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> is of the same opinion as Ben Nannus!]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who stated that the second expression cancels the first. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> — But, [it may be replied that] 'this', [may denote that Samuel] is of the same opinion.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As Ben Nannus. 'This etc', only indicates that the Rabbis disagree. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> Does [Samuel, however,] hold the same opinion? Surely Samuel said: [The Mishnah which states that the rent of the bath house for the intercalary month is to be divided] speaks [only of the case] where [the owner] comes<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To the court. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> in the middle<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since it is doubtful which expression cancels which, the money and the bath house are to remain in the possession of their respective owners. For the first half of the month, therefore, which has already passed, no rent can be claimed from the tenant who is in possession of his money. For the second half, however, the owner may claim the rent, since the property is his, and he has the power to prevent the other from using it. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> of the month, but where he comes at the beginning of the month all [the rent of the month] belongs to the owner,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because the property is in his possession. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> [and if he comes] at the end of the month, all [the rent of the month] belongs to the tenant.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because his money is to remain with him, who holds it in possession. ');"><sup>27</sup></span> [Does not this prove that Samuel disagrees<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since he is doubtful as to whether the first, or second expression is to be regarded as binding. Cf. supra n. 6. ');"><sup>28</sup></span> with Ben Nannus?]
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A drew up a legal document in which he used the following words: "Effective as of today, but to be executed after our (meaning himself and his wife, L) deaths, our daughter R shall inherit an equal share with her brothers, those already born and those that might be born, in whatever will remain of my estate." After A's death, his children and his widow, L, interpreted the document to mean that A had appointed L trustee over his estate. When L proved a very inefficient, careless, and wasteful trustee, A's sons reached an agreement with L, whereby she was to receive forty marks for turning over the estate to A's sons immediately. Before relinquishing her trusteeship, L and her youngest son B (who was eighteen years of age) agreed to allow R's husband to take his wife's share of the estate immediately, without having to wait for L's death. A's two other sons object to this latter agreement.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A drew up a legal document in which he used the following words: "Effective as of today, but to be executed after our (meaning himself and his wife, L) deaths, our daughter R shall inherit an equal share with her brothers, those already born and those that might be born, in whatever will remain of my estate." After A's death, his children and his widow, L, interpreted the document to mean that A had appointed L trustee over his estate. When L proved a very inefficient, careless, and wasteful trustee, A's sons reached an agreement with L, whereby she was to receive forty marks for turning over the estate to A's sons immediately. Before relinquishing her trusteeship, L and her youngest son B (who was eighteen years of age) agreed to allow R's husband to take his wife's share of the estate immediately, without having to wait for L's death. A's two other sons object to this latter agreement.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A drew up a legal document in which he used the following words: "Effective as of today, but to be executed after our (meaning himself and his wife, L) deaths, our daughter R shall inherit an equal share with her brothers, those already born and those that might be born, in whatever will remain of my estate." After A's death, his children and his widow, L, interpreted the document to mean that A had appointed L trustee over his estate. When L proved a very inefficient, careless, and wasteful trustee, A's sons reached an agreement with L, whereby she was to receive forty marks for turning over the estate to A's sons immediately. Before relinquishing her trusteeship, L and her youngest son B (who was eighteen years of age) agreed to allow R's husband to take his wife's share of the estate immediately, without having to wait for L's death. A's two other sons object to this latter agreement.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy